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Holger Baumann
Reconsidering Relational Autonomy.
Personal Autonomy for Socially Embedded and
Temporally Extended Selves
Abstract: Most recent accounts of personal autonomy acknowledge that the social en-
vironment a person lives in, and the personal relationships she entertains, have some
impact on her autonomy. Two kinds of conceptualizing social conditions aie tradi-
tionally distinguished in this regard: Causally relational accounts hold that certain
relationships and social environments play a causal role for the development and on-
going exercise of autonomy. Constitutively relational accounts, by contrast, claim that
autonomy is at least partly constituted by a person's social environment or standing.
The central aim of this paper is to raise the question how causally and constitutively
relational approaches relate to the fact that we exercise our autonomy over time. I
argue that once the temporal scope of autonomy is opened up, we need not only to
think differently about the social dimension of autonomy. We also need to reconsider
the very distinction between causally and constitutively relational accounts, because it
is itself a synchronie (and not a diachronic) distinction.
0. The Debate about Relational Autonomy
The social environment a person lives in, and the personal relationships she
entertains, have without doubt an impact on her autonomy. Any account of
personal autonomy that negates this fact is untenable on descriptive as well as
on normative grounds. Neither are we self-made or self-sufficient beings who exist
in complete isolation from others; nor is an understanding of personal autonomy
as self-sufficient independence an ideal to be aspired at, or a value that deserves
the centrality it is given in modern Western societies.
As is widely known, many of the early feminist and communitarian critiques
leveled against autonomy (and liberalism) originated from this identification of
autonomous agents with self-sufficient rational choosers, who create their own
principles and are substantively independent of others.^ Against this picture,
feminists and communitarians alike stressed the social embeddedness of persons:
the identity-forming influence of others, the significance of intimate relationships
^ Jennifer Nedelsky is maybe the most prominent case in point. She attacks "the liberal
vision of human beings as self-made and self-making men" (Nedelsky 1989, 8).
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and deep attachments, the important role that social forms (e.g. language and
culture) play for an agent's deliberation, and several other ways in which social
arrangements exert an influence on our lives.^
Some of the critics were led by such considerations to abandon the concept of
autonomy altogether, claiming that modern preoccupation with autonomy was
unwarranted and even harmful: autonomy is unrealizable for social beings like us,'
but this is no loss, since the underlying ideal denies valuable aspects of our lives|
and only gives expression to a misguided and potentially oppressive male ideal of
leading one's life. Other philosophers of this tradition opposed to the dismissal
of autonomy and instead called for its 'relational' or 'social' reconceptualization.'
They contended that "it is not autonomy as such, but the individualistic manner'
of its conceptualization which is problematic" (Friedman 1985, 158), and insisted;
that feminists in particular should "retain the value [of autonomy], while rejec-,
ting its liberal incarnation" (Nedelsky 1989, 7). These writers regard autonomy!
as vital to important (feminist) interests, and they highlight that the concept of^
autonomy does not imply self-sufRcient independence, the latter only being one!
objectionable conception of autonomy.^ In other words, autonomy—understood'
as self-government—must not be interpreted along the lines of substantively in-1
dependent, 'Cartesian' selves. This move, in turn, paves the way for "reconceiving'
autonomy" in a more 'relational' or 'social' way."*
In what follows, I want to critically examine the prospects and problems oí
'socializing autonomy', firstly by putting into perspective two different approa-|
ches to incorporate the social dimension of autonomy, and secondly by relating
these approaches to the question of how to accommodate the temporal dimen-
sion of autonomy. I will thus sidestep any general arguments to the effect thati
autonomy should be abandoned or replaced by other values.® Nonetheless, se-;
veral lessons can be learned from such arguments: on the one hand, theories of
autonomy should to some extent be empirically informed, because they other-!
wise run danger of construing autonomy in a way that contradicts facts about'
our (social) existence; on the other hand, any theory of autonomy should he
evaluated by asking whether it describes a valuable condition of persons that
can, at the same time, serve the practical and theoretical role(s) the concept:
of autonomy is assigned in political, moral, legal and personal discourses. The'
^ For helpful overviews of the vast literature, and further references, see Friedman 2003;
ch. 4; MacKenzie/Stoljar 2000; Christman 2004. I
3 Cf. Friedman 2003 and Stoljar/Mackenzie 2000, 5. ,
* For the purposes of my discussion, I will use these terms interchangeably. But see Christy
man 2004, fn 15: "The terms 'relational' and 'social' do not mean the same thing, and it would
be instructive to examine their different connotations and implications, given the variety of mo-f
tivations for [... ] non-individualized accounts. For example, 'relational' views seem to express
more thorougly the need to underscore interpersonal dynamics as components of autonomy;
dynamics such as caring relations, interpersonal dependence, and intimacy. 'Social' accounts
imply, I think, a broader view, where various other kinds of social factors—institutional setf
tings, cultural patterns, political factors—might all come into play." I
^ A very helpful discussion of such arguments can be found in Mackenzie/Stoljar 2000, 5ff.L
They distinguish between "five major feminist critiques of autonomy: symbolic, metaphysical^
care, postmodernist, and diversity" and try to show that "none of them justifies rejecting the
concept of autonomy altogether" (ibid., 5).
Reconsidering Relational Autonomy 447
importance of these requirements will hopefully become obvious in the course of
this paper.
Before I can set out the specific concerns I have, a bit more needs to be
said about the further development of, and shift of focus in, the philosophical
debate since the 1980s.® In general, the question is no longer whether autonomy
has social conditions, but rather what these conditions are and how they are
to be conceptualized. In many recent accounts of personal autonomy the soci-
al dimension is acknowledged in one way or another. Hence, most theories are
"relational" in the broad sense defined by Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stol-
jar, who characterize relational accounts as "sharing the conviction that persons
are socially embedded and that agents' identities are formed within the context
of social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determi-
nants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity" (MacKenzie/Stoljar 2000, 4).
And although there axe still some influential accounts of autonomy that neglect
the social dimension altogether—e.g. those of Harry Frankfurt (1988) and Alfred
Mele (1995)—, even these accounts are at least in principle compatible with a
broadly relational outlook.^
To label an account "relational" in the broad sense is thus not—or no longer—
particularly informative. It does not differentiate competing accounts of auto-
nomy in an interesting way. But there are important philosophical differences
between accounts that are relational in the broad sense, having to do in particu-
lar with the way in which they incorporate social conditions. In this regard, the
distinction between 'causally relational' and 'constitutively relational' accounts
has become crucial. It is traditionally explained along the following lines:*
Proponents of causally relational accounts hold that certain relationships and
social environments play a causal role for the development and ongoing exercise
of autonomy. Social conditions operate, on this view, as background conditions
of autonomy or as contributory factors to its realization. Autonomy itself, howe-
ver, is understood in an individualistic fashion. Being autonomous means that
certain psychological states obtain or that a person has and effectively exercises
relevant psychological capacities or competences. Hence, according to defenders
of causally relational accounts, the question whether a person is autonomous can
be fully answered with reference to her internal psychological states or capacities.
Social conditions need not be mentioned in the definition of autonomy.
By contrast, those who put forward constitutively relational accounts de-
ny that social conditions are background conditions only. Instead they believe
that the relationship between a person's autonomy and the social environment
she lives in is more intimate: Among the "defining condition" of autonomy are
"requirements concerning the interpersonal or social environment of the agent"
^ An instructive overview of these developments in the debate from a feminist perspective
can be found in Friedman 2003, ch. 4. She speaks of a certain "convergence of feminist and
mainstream conceptions of autonomy" (ibid., 87ff.).
^ This is due to the fact that these accounts do not embrace a conception of autonomy as
self-sufficiency or self-creation that is incompatible with the claim that social conditions play
some role in developing, exercising or attaining autonomy.
* For the following, see especially Christman 2004, 144ff.; Friedman 2003, 57f.; MackKen-
zie/Stoljar 2000, 22; Oshana 1998, 96f.; 2006, 49 and 70.
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(Christman 2004, 148). Social conditions are treated as "conceptually necessary
requirements of autonomy" (ibid.). In other words, what it means to be auto-
nomous, according to proponents of constitutively social accounts, cannot be
spelled out without direct reference to a person's social environment, her so-
cial position or standing. The 'social' is written directly into the definiton of
autonomy.
With this distinction in hand, I can now state the objectives of the subsequent
discussion and my way of proceeding. In the first part of this paper, I want to
examine two very influential takes on relational autonomy, namely those of John
Christman and Marina Oshana. These philosophers have provided some of the
most detailed analyses of autonomy that are explicitly relational in the broad
sense mentioned above, and they have decidedly taken a stand on the question
whether autonomy is or should be regarded as causally relational (Christman) or
as constitutively relational (Oshana). In a first step, I will outline these views and
explain why they qualify as causally or constitutively relational (1.). In a second
step, I will investigate the commitments and motivations underlying the different
approaches to the social dimension of autonomy. I regard the quarrel between
Oshana and Christman as interesting in its own right, and it brings to light many
important issues. Also, it yields a positive answer to the question whether the
distinction between causal and constitutive accounts is practically important
(2.).^ In addition, it allows me to set out some general and methodological
points for discussions about the concept of autonomy and its (relational re-)
conceptualization (3.).
These general refiections on how to argue about (relational) autonomy cru-
cially inform my discussion in the second part of the paper, in which I want
to bring together two debates that too often have been led in separation from
each other: the debate about the social dimension of autonomy (How are we
to account for the fact that we are socially embedded beings?) and the debate
about the temporal dimension of autonomy (How are we to account for the fact
that we are "temporally extended" beings?).^° More specifically, I want to ask
how causally and constitutively relational approaches relate to the fact that we
exercise our autonomy over time—that we have a history and a future, that we
develop our identities and emancipate ourselves from others over time, that we
sometimes change our minds and take different directions, that we find ourselves
in changing relationships and social environments, etc. Are there any principal
reasons to take one approach or the other? Again, I introduce and motivate this
question in the context of Oshana's and Christman's respective treatments of
autonomy (4.).
My rather bold claim is that once the temporal scope of autonomy is opened
up, we need not only to reconsider how to incorporate social conditions of au-
tonomy. We may also have to reconsider the very distinction between causally
and constitutively relational accounts, which is itself a synchronie (and not a
® This question is raised, e.g., in Friedman 2003, 97.
^^  I borrow the term "temporal extendedness" from Michael Bratman who stresses that it is
"a deep and important feature of our agency that it is temporally extended" (Bratman 2007,
4).
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diachronic) distinction. Of course, within the limits of this paper, I will not be
able to fully substantiate this claim or to develop a conception of 'diachronic
autonomy' that does justice to what I call the 'social and temporal dynamics' of
autonomy. But I hope to give at least some reasons why it might be a worthwhi-
le task to reconsider relational autonomy from the perspective of our temporal
extendedness, and to set the stage for further discussions (5.).
1. Two Models of Personal Autonom.y
Christman's Historical Account
The basic idea underlying John Christman's account of personal autonomy is
that a person is autonomous if she governs her behavior in accordance with mo-
tivational states that are expressive of her 'true' or 'authentic' self. ^ '^  Two kinds
of conditions are distinguished in this respect: Competency conditions include
those conditions "that indicate that the agent is able to function adequately
in judgments and choice" (Christman 2005a, 278), while authenticity conditions
ensure that the motives "that move an agent to action are, in some sense, her
true, authentic desires and motives" (ibid.).
This general characterization of autonomy is given the following interpreta-
tion: On the one hand, a person qualifies as competent only if her set of moti-
vational and cognitive states does not involve manifest contradictions ("minimal
rationality"), if she does not suffer from grave self-deception ("self-awareness"),
and if she is able to effectively carry out her intentions in the absence of exter-
nal barriers ("self-control").^ '^  On the other hand, a person's motivational state
C counts as authentic if she would not "feel deeply alienated" from this state,
"were she to engage in sustained reflection on C, and do so in light of the histori-
cal processes (adequately described) that gave rise to C" (Christman 2007, 21).
Alienation is understood here as "feeling constrained by the trait and wanting
decidedly to repudiate it" (Christman 2007, 12).^ ^
On this account, autonomy is largely a subjective matter that is decided
from within a person's perspective. Consider, e.g., Hanna and Peter who both
have a strong and pervasive disposition to compete with others. Every time they
face other persons who challenge them or who fare better than them in certain
respects, they desire to take up the challenge and to trump them. Now, while
Peter's reflective stance towards this disposition—in light of the historical pro-
cesses that gave rise to it—is a feeling of alienation, Hanna does not undergo any
such feelings. Hence, even though Hanna and Peter may share their 'objective
condition' (social environment, education, etc.), only Peter does not count as au-
^' The crucial point of reference with regard to this basic idea of autonomy—that underlies
many accounts in the recent debate—is, of course, Frankfurt 1988, ch. 2.
12 See, e.g., Christman 2005a, 278f. and 2007, 20f..
1^  See especially Christman 2001, 202f., for the reasons why he conceives of the relevant
attitude that constitutes 'authenticity' in terms of 'non-alienation' (instead of 'endorsement'
or 'identification' like Frankfurt and others).
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tonomous relative to his disposition, because it is not expressive of his authentic i
self. Hanna, by contrast, 'owns' her disposition and the subsequent behavior.
Christman introduces two additional conditions that are meant to safeguard
the basic conditions of competence and authenticity, and especially to secure that '
the reflection is expressive of the agent's own standpoint. Firstly, a person must|
be procedurally independent:^^ In developing and exercising her capabilities for;
self-reflection and self-control, a person must not be/have been under the influ- ;
ence of factors that subvert these very capacities and from which she would feel ;
alienated were she reflect on them adequately. ^ ^ For example, if Hanna's stance I
towards her disposition to compete with others is due to an upbringing that
renders her unable to reflect on this disposition, and if she would feel alienated!
from this inability were she to reflect on the factors that gave rise to it, she is
not autonomous, despite her state of non-alienation. As an epistemic test for the '
condition of procedural independence, Christman suggests that a person must be
"able to realistically imagine choosing otherwise were she in a position to value ¡
sincerely that alternative position" (Christman 2007, 14). The second additio-,
nal condition Christman puts forward is that a person must meet the condition
of reflective non-alienation in a "robust manner". As an epistemic test for this '
condition, Christman suggests that the hypothetical reflection must yield the
same results "repeated over a variety circumstances" (ibid., 18). If, for example, '.
Hanna's stance towards her disposition constantly changes in different situations !
and at different points of time, her actual state of non-alienation does not yield
autonomy because she does not meet the autonomy-guaranteeing conditions in '
a robust manner.^ ® :
How does the 'social' come into the picture, and why does this account qualify \
as causally relational? As to the flrst question, there are at least two points at !
which Christman explicitly addresses the social environment of a person. Firstly, \
in reflecting on the historical processes that gave rise to her motivational states, ¡
a person will certainly need to take into account the influence that other persons |
and her social environment exerted on her, if she is to conceive adequately of,
these processes. Secondly, the condition of procedural independence is specified ,
with explicit reference to the social environment: the reflection must be such that !
"it is not the product of social and psychological conditions that prevent adequate
appraisals of oneself" (Christman 2007, 14). This is the case, for example, if ^
the person "has been denied all education, has been systematically punished
when expressing curiosity about alternative conditions, [or] if her skills have
been narrowly fashioned to accept only one role" (Christman 2001, 206). I
*^ In his more recent publications, Christman avoids using the term of procedural indepen-
dence and instead speaks, e.g., of "effective reflection" (Christman 2005a, 280). I use the former
term because it is somehow established in the debate. For more on the notion of procedural '
independence, see Dworkin 1976. ;
^^  The hypothetical/counterfactual formulation of this condition is important because it'
opens up the possibility that people can retain their autonomy (and procedural independence) [
even if they live under conditions that actually inhibit their self-reflective capacities. Oshana i
(2006, 38) raises some important questions with regard to this counterfactual condition.
^^  More recently, Christman has termed this condition the condition of SCR ("sustained i
criticial reflection"). See Christman 2007, 18. I
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Christman's account thereby qualifies as relational in the broad sense. It is a
causally relational account, however, because social conditions are referred to as
background conditions only. They are relevant to autonomy only insofar as they
have an impact on a person's capacities for self-refiection or give rise to a feeling
of alienation if refiected upon. Autonomy itself is defined solely with reference to
a person's capacities and her psychological states, namely the capacities referred
to in the conditions of competence/authenticity and the state of refiective non-
alienation.
Oshana 's Socio-Relational Account
Marina Oshana's account of autonomy strongly contrasts with the account given
by Christman. To begin with, the basic idea underlying her account is that a
person is autononnous if she is in control of her life and if she occupies a social
position of authority over matters of fundamental importance to the direction of
her life.^ ^ Like Christman, Oshana distinguishes two kinds of conditions in this
regard: Control conditions guarantee that persons are "in actual control of their
own choices, actions and goals", while authority conditions ensure that persons
"own" the "management of [their] choices, actions and goals" (Oshana 2006, 3f.).
At first sight, these conditions seem to mirror the general conditions set out
by Christman, although reference to the social position of a person is already
made in this basic definition of autonomy. The crucial differences become ap-
parent once the content Oshana gives to these conditions is spelled out.^* Both
conditions include internal (psychological) and external (social) elements. While
being in control entails that a person must be competent—she must have the
capacities for self-awareness, self-understanding Eind self-evaluation, as well as
the capacities for instrumental rationality, means-end rationality and critical ra-
tionality (see Oshana 2006, 76ff.)—, this does not suffice. In addition, a person
must enjoy "regulative control": she must be in a social position from which she is
able to control her social environment in the sense that she can actually "manage
key aspects of her life against other persons or institutions that might attempt
to wield coercive control over her" (ibid., 84). This comprises having access to
an adequate range of options, where adequacy is specified independently of a
person's perspective and requires at least that the person has one option that is
different from choosing non-autonomy (ibid.,
^^  For similar accounts that draw on the idea that a person's autonomy is partly consti-
tuted by the objective social position she occupies, see also Leist 2005, ch. 2; Santiago 2005;
Kauppinnen 2009.
'® Note, however, that in finally setting out the necessary and sufficient conditions of auto-
nomy (Oshana 2006, ch. 4), Oshana does not explicitly assign these conditions to the two kinds
of conditions she distinguishes at the beginning of her book; consequently she might object to
my way of presenting her account in this regard, but this is only a matter of interpretation.
'^ The condition that a person must have a relevant range of adequate options has pro-
minently been defended by Joseph Raz (1986, ch. 14). This condition is an objective and
external condition because the adequacy of options is not determined from the person's own
perspective: Even if a person happily accepts a situation in which she has no options, her range
of options is not adequate and she therefore does not count as autonomous.
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As to the second condition, having authority requires at the same time more
and less than enjoying 'authenticity' in Christman's sense. In order to own (the
management of) her desires and values, a person does not have to be in a state
of non-alienation. It rather sufRces that she acknowledges crucial aspects of her
identity, where acknowledgment is compatible with feelings of alienation (ibid.,
69) .^^ On the other hand, a person must—as an internal condition—regard her-
self as being worthy of directing her life (ibid., 81).^ ^ More importantly, she must
not only be free from factors that inhibit her self-reflection and thus prevent it
from being effective in a procedurally independent sense (ibid., 78f.). She mustl
also occupy a social position that renders her substantively independent. This
includes, e.g., that she is supplied with certain material and psychological re-
sources; that she "can have, and can pursue, values, interests and goals different
from those who have influence and authority over her, without risk of reprisal
sufficient to deter her in this pursuit", gind that she is "not required to take
responsibility for another's needs, expectations, and failings unless doing so is
reasonably expected of [her] in light of a particular function" (ibid., 87).
Autonomy, on this account, is at least partly an objective matter that is
decided independently from the person's own perspective and her internal states.
Consider, again, the case of Hanna and Peter. Even if Hanna meets all internal
conditions, she might still not count as autonomous. Say, for example, that
Hanna lives in an environment where competition is regarded as indispensable,
and that she has no realistic option of leaving this environment. Because in
this scenario, Hanna is not allowed to give up her disposition to compete with
others, she would qualify, on Oshana's account, as non-autonomous because of
her social position. Peter, by contrast, might prove to be autonomous despite
his state of alienation, provided that he fulfills the internal conditions and, more
importantly, the external conditions of regulative control, an adequate range of
options, cind substantive independence.
As should be obvious, the 'social' is assigned a very different place in this
account than in Christman's. Crucially, both control and authority conditions
make explicit reference to a person's social status and to external social criteria
that are independent of her psychological make-up. Rather than merely causally
contributing to the development and ongoing exercise of capacities that are rele-
vant to autonomy, a person's social position is regarded as (partly) constituting
her autonomy. In Oshana's own words: "Autonomy is not a phenomenon merely
enhanced or lessened by the contingencies of a person's social situation [...].
Rather, appropriate social relations form an inherent part of what it means to
be self-directed." (ibid., 50)
2° See also Oshana 2005 and 2007.
^^  This condition has been stressed by Paul Benson in several articles. See Benson 1994; Í
2005a and 2005b.
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2. Entering the Debate about Causally vs. Constitutively
Relational Approaches
Up to this point, I have only outlined the accounts given by Oshana and Christ-
man, and I have explained how the distinction between causally and constitu-
tively relational accounts applies to them. I now want to investigate the com-
mitments and motivations that underlie these different approaches to the social
dimension of autonomy. It will become clear that the prevailing reasons differ
significantly. Christman's defence of a causally relational approach is crucially
informed by the "conceptual requirement" of content-neutrality, while Oshana
makes her case for a constitutively relational account primarily by appeal to
intuitive judgments about paradigmatic cases. I will roughly outline the crucial
lines of argument and raise some critical questions. Drawing on these questi-
ons, I will then, in the next section, analyse the quarrel between Oshana and
Christman in a more general and systematic way.
Oshana's Case for a Constitutively Relational Approach
Oshana contends that any account of personal autonomy that does not incor-
porate external social conditions yields counterintuitive results and should the-
refore be rejected. Drawing on detailed case studies she spends much time on
showing that persons can fulfill all the conditions proposed by causally relational
accounts, while intuitively judged these persons lack autonomy. She then goes
on to argue for her socio-relational account, by indicating that only within this
account our intuitive judgments concerning such cases can be captured.
To illustrate Oshana's reasoning, let me sketch two of her examples: A slave
might not feel deeply alienated from his commitment or situation and thus count
as autonomous on Christman's account. Intuitively judged, however, he lacks
autonomy (Oshana 2006, 56if.). This can be explained, Oshana claims, only
with reference to the condition of regulative control. Because the slave is not
"empowered to challenge others who might attempt to direct [him] against [his]
wishes" (Oshana 2006, 84) and has no access to an adequate range of options,
he fails to be autonomous. Similarly, a subservient woman, who always lives up
to the wishes of others and is not recognized as being someone who can choose
for herself (ibid., 57ff.), may meet all the conditions set out by Christman and
others. Notwithstanding, we consider her to be non-autonomous, according to
Oshana, because she is not substantively independent: It is not true of her, e.g.,
that she is not illegitimately required to take responsibility for the needs of
other persons (see section 2). Both conditions refer to an agent's social position
or status and are thus constitutively social conditions.
Several questions can be raised with regard to Oshana's case for a constitu-
tively relational approach to the social dimension of autonomy. To begin with, it
is at least questionable that the intuitions converge on the cases to which Osha-
na alludes, and it is always open to defenders of causally relational approaches
to refine and amend their conditions in order to better capture onr intuitive
judgments. In general, it seems to be a hard task to justify the shift from a
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causal to a constitutive account by appeals to intuitive plausibility (although, in
fairness to Oshana, it must be emphasized that at some point one must appeal
to intuitions, because this is the only way to motivate a shift at all). At least two
more questions suggest themselves with regard to the practical and theoretical
implications of the socio-relational account: Firstly, does Oshana conflate the
notions of autonomy and positive freedom, which should be kept conceptually
separate, because otherwise the notion of autonomy looses its conceptual distinc-
tiveness and can be substituted? And, secondly, does an account of autonomy,
that excludes those ways of life that are incompatible with the socio-relational '
conditions lead to an objectionable form of paternalism and an elitist understan-
ding of who can participate in democratic processes? It is exactly at this latter
point at which Christman enters the discussion.
Christman's Case for a Causally Relational Approach
The crucial argument Christman offers in favor of a causally relationally ap-
proach is that constitutively relational accounts are not content-neutral, while
content-neutrality is a "conceptual requirement" of personal autonomy, provided
that this concept is used in "certain political contexts, in particular as funda-
mental to the specification of who is the subject of justice and what the basic
interests of such subjects are" (Christman 2005a, 293, 285). According to Christ-
man, accounts of autonomy that exclude as non-autonomous certain desires, va-
lues, or ways of life for conceptual reasons—and thus violate the requirement of,
content-neutrality—should be rejected because autonomy is thereby rendered a
perfectionist "ideal for individuals to relate to or to reject" (ibid.). It thus cannot
serve the role of a basic value that it is assigned in political contexts. For exam-
ple, a 'content-laden' notion of autonomy results in the problematic exclusion
of those who pursue other ways of life and reject the ideal of autonomy. Since
constitutively relational accounts yield substantive restrictions on the content of
desires, values, or ways of life persons might entertain, Christman contends that
one should embrace the causal approach.
How does the divide between causally and constitutively relational accounts
relate to the question of content-neutrality? More specifically, why do constitu-
tively relational accounts qualify—qua being constitutively relational—as sub-
stantive or content-laden? The answer is implicit in the definition of these ac-
counts. As I have explained, their defining characteristic is that in order to count
as autonomous, a person must find herself in specific social relations or environ- ;
ments. In Oshana's view, e.g., a person must have access to an adequate range of '
options and be substantively independent. In consequence, neither a person who
only has the option of choosing non-autonomy nor a person who lacks minimal •
material or psychological resources can possibly be autonomous. Christman's
account, by contrast, allows for the possibility that even such persons qualify as
autonomous. What is crucial to autonomy is the reflective stance a person takes
towards herself, i.e. whether she feels deeply alienated from her commitments
or from her situation under conditions of procedural independence. This yields
the result that even a slave or a subservient woman can in principle be labeled
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autonomous.•^^ While Oshana's theory is a substantive theory, then, Christman's
account is content-neutral.
As in the case of Oshana, several critical questions can be raised with re-
gard to this line of argument. To begin with, it is questionable whether the
requirement of content-neutrality can be derived from the role the concept of
autonomy is meant to serve in political contexts. Does the relevant notion of
autonomy really have to be content-neutral, or does it suffice that no proble-
matic normative restrictions on who can count as autonomous are invoked? ^ ^ If
so, can a constitutively relational account be defended against the charge put
forward by Christman?^'' Another way to challenge Christman's argument is to
raise worries with regard to the notion of procedural independence: Does this
notion, once it is spelled out in some detail, already introduce certain conceptual
restrictions on who can count as autonomous, because, e.g., it excludes living
in a community where persons are systematically punished when expressing cu-
riosity about alternative conditions etc.?^^ Finally, it might be asked whether
conceptions of content-neutral autonomy describe a valuable condition of per-
sons. Put differently, does an account of autonomy that allows for the possibility
of autonomous slaves or subservient women loose its distinctive role of providing
a standpoint from which the institutions of a society can be judged as just or as
providing the opportunity for human fiourishing?'^®
3. How to Argue about (Relational) Autonomy
At least some of the issues I have raised in the last section concerning Oshana's
and Christman's case for a constitutively respectively causally relational ap-
proach have received much discussion in the literature (see footnotes). Instead
of entering these substantive debates, however, I want to take a step back and
extract several general methodological points from the quarrel between Oshana
and Christman. My aim is to provide something like a framework for discussion
against which the prospects and problems of diflFerent (relational) approaches to
autonomy can be evaluated. This framework will crucially inform my discussion
in the next two sections, but I think that it is also informative and of avail in
its own right.
^^  Though Christman, like other defenders of content-neutral accounts, suggests that it
might often not be the case that such persons fulfill the procedural conditions he regards as
necessary and sufficient for autonomy.
•^* On the notion of content-neutrality and the possibility of "weakly substantive accounts",
see especially Benson 2005a and Kristinsson 2000.
"^^ For arguments along these lines, see for example Oshana 2006, ch. 5, and Westlundt 2009.
*^ Cf. Oshana 2006, 43. In a similar fashion, John Santiago has argued that "in fact, the CPI
[conditions of procedural independence] stipulate that autonomy requires an agent to inhabit
something like a positive social position" (Santiago 2005, 96). He goes on to embrace a view
very similar to Oshana's. Interestingly, in specifying the "nature of the autonomous space" he
extrapolates backwards Christman's conditions of procedural independence in order to "achieve
positive conditions" (ibid., 97).
^^  See Christman 2004, 153, and Oshana 2006, 80.
456 Holger Baumann
Practical Interests, Appeals to Intuitions, and the Conceptual Distinctiveness of
Autonomy
In presenting how Oshana and Christman argue for their different takes on the
social dimension of autonomy, I have implicitly distinguished two different ap-
proaches: appeals to intuitive plausibility and reflections about the practical and
theoretical role of autonomy. While Oshana rests her case primarily on reflec-
tions about specific cases, Christman starts from a certain practial interest in
the notion of autonomy, from which he derives the conceptual requirement of
content-neutrality that is incompatible with constitutively relational accounts.
This way of presenting the accounts has without doubt been one-sided, since
neither does Oshana rely exclusively on intuitions, nor does Christman base his
account and his stance towards constitutively relational accounts exclusively on
conceptual considerations about the concept of autonomy.
However, my way of presenting the accounts helps me to motivate the general
question how one should approach discussions about autonomy. By dwelling on
paradigmatic cases? Or by reflecting on the concept of autonomy in the light of
the practical and theoretical role it is meant to play (what I call the practical
interest in autonomy)? Assuming for a moment that this is a real alternative, I
want to opt for the latter: ^ ^
Firstly, if one does not specify one's practical interest in the notion of autono-
my, one might end up criticizing a conception of autonomy that is not intended
to capture the sense of 'autonomy' in which one is interested. The notion of
autonomy is used in many different legal, political, moral and personal contexts,
and one should not take it for granted that there is a unified account of auto-
nomy that can be applied to all of these contexts (though there certainly must
be some overlap because otherwise it becomes unintelligible why to use the term
'autonomy' anymore).^* Secondly, the practical interest one has in autonomy
already informs the intuitions concerning specific cases. If one is interested, e.g.,
in autonomy as a concept relevant to questions of moral responsibility, how one
judges a person's autonomy might importantly differ from one's judgment about
the same case in a different context, e.g. in the context of autonomy as a perso-
nal ideal of living. A person may count as autonomous in the sense relevant to
moral responsibility, while she might lack autonomy in the sense of autonomy
as a personal ideal. Thirdly, by setting out the practical interest in autonomy,
one can derive some general requirements or adequacy conditions that inform
one's discussion and set the limits within which one might explicate the concept
of autonomy. Christman's stance towards constitutively relational accounts il-
lustrates this point very nicely, but one can also mention Oshana's worries that
content-neutral conceptions of autonomy do not describe a valuable condition
^"^ I have greatly benefitted from discussion about these general questions with John Christ-
man and with Christian Seidel, who works independently on these issues (see Seidel 2008).
®^ One might also want to appeal to the notoriously vague notion of 'family resemblance'
in this context. What I want to emphasize at this point is that one should avoid a complete
fragmentation of autonomy. For example, Arpaly (2003, ch. 4) distinguishes eight senses of
autonomy and treats them as being more or less completely independent from each other.
This is, in my view, unsatisfying from a theoretical perspective.
Reconsidering Relational Autonomy 457
of persons, and thus are of no use in the shaping of just institutions that enable
the members of a community to flourish.
These considerations raise the immediate suspicion that by specifying a cer-
tain practical interest, one can dissolve all possible disagreements and render
immune from criticism any conception of autonomy. But this, of course, is not
what I aim at. What I want to emphasize is that intuitions about specific ex-
amples are always informed to some extent by a certain practical interest in
autonomy.^^ By making explicit this interest, one can then begin to argue about
the following questions:^" Is the interest an interest in autonomy? (Can it be
related to the basic idea that autonomy means to be self-governed?) Is it a le-
gitimate interest in autonomy? (Does the distinction between autonomy and
non-autonomy serve any worthy purpose?) And does the practical interest yield
a notion of autonomy that is conceptually distinct and that cannot be substi-
tuted by other concepts? (Can the role that such a notion of autonomy plays
better be articulated with appeal to other notions?)
Instead of appealing to'Tree floating intuitions" (Christman 2005a, 282) about
allegedly paradigmatic cases, then, one should start by speciflng a certain prac-
tical interest in autonomy—what is the notion of autonomy meant to accom-
plish?^^ In a second step, one should make clear why this is a legitimate interest
in a notion of autonomy that is both conceptually distinct and that cannot be
substituted by other concepts.^^ Against this background, one can take a fur-
ther step and attend to the question whether the practical interest one has yields
certain constraints on the concept of autonomy. And only then, in a last step,
one should investigate whether one or the other conceptualization of autonomy
better flts with certain intuitive judgments concerning speciflc cases, where these
examples qualify as relevant only if considered from a shared practical interest
in autonomy and if there is a certain agreement on the constraints this interest
^^  Double (1992) ignores the possibility that the conditions of autonomy might be context-
dependent. Starting from the interesting observation that any account of autonomy faces at
least one counterexample, he suggests that one should 'subjectivize' autonomy, i.e. understand
conditions of autonomy as relative to individual persons. 1 would suggest, by contrast, that
one should 'contextualize' autonomy, i.e. understand conditions of autonomy as being relative
to practical contexts that are individuated by practical interests.
^^  I would like to thank Susanne Boshammer for helping me to see more clearly that dis-
cussions about different notions of autonomy may be redescribed as discussions about the
legitimacy of practical interests in autonomy and about the conceptual distinctiveness of the
conceptions that are informed by such different interests.
31 See Christman 2005, 282f..
•^^  As I have indicated, Oshana needs to keep separate her notion of autonomy from of the
notion of positive freedom; similarly, one might suggest that Christman needs to keep the
notion of autonomy separate from a notion of basic respect owed to each adult person.
3^ The description I am giving here of how to approach discussions about autonomy is
certainly a highly idealized one. In practice, discussions will often, and necessarily, be initiated
by specific examples that generate conflicting intuitions. What is important, however, is that
such disagreements should always lead one back to the questions about practical interests
that I have set out. Only then one will avoid engaging in endless discussions about conflicting
intuitions, while in fact the disagreements arise at a much deeper level.
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Keeping in mind this admittedly abstract schema for approaching discussions
about autonomy, I am now, on the hand, in a position to redescribe in a con-
cise way the quarrel between Oshana and Christman: first and foremost, they
disagree about the conceptual requirement of content neutrality and not about
certain intuitions concerning 'paradigmatic cases'. On the other hand, I can set
out my own way of entering discussions about the social dimension of autonomy.
In short, I will draw on a specific practical interest in autonomy and relate this
interest to the question of how to conceive of the social dimension of autonomy.
4. Reconsidering Relational Autonomy—Putting the
Temporal Dimension into Perspective
Very roughly, I am interested in personal autonomy as a regulative ideal that
informs the ways in which persons can strive for leading a 'life of their own'.
Autonomy, on this understanding, is applied to a person's life, or her way of
living, as a socially embedded and temporally extended being. Hence, my interest '
in autonomy opens up both the social and the temporal dimension of autonomy.
The question I want to raise with regard to the divide between causally and
constitutively relational approaches is the following: Are there any principal
reasons to take one or the other approach, given that what one is interested in is
a notion of 'diachronic autonomy' that applies to persons who are leading their
lives in changing social environments over time?
Let me begin to explain this way of approaching the question by relating it to
the accounts given by Oshana and Christman. Crucially, both endorse additive
views of what it means to govern one's life over time. According to Christman,
a person is always autonomous relative to a particular desire or trait at some
time.^^ He thus construes the concept of autonomy in a local fashion in two sen-
ses: Autonomy is primarily a property of particular motivational states (instead
of being a property of persons), and it is a property that applies to this parti-
cular state at some time (instead of applying to a person over extended periods
of time). Speaking more globally of a person's autonomy is to be understood
derivatively. A person is globally autonomous if she is autonomous relative to a
sufficient number of motivational states, and if this former condition holds over
extended periods of time.^^
Oshana, by contrast, applies the property of autonomy to persons. According
to her, there is no "natural transition" from local autonomy—as a property of:
particular motivational states at some time, constituted by a person's psycho-
logical states—to global autonomy as a property of persons who exercise their
autonomy in a social context, and whose autonomy is partly constituted by
their social position at some time. But her account is still additive with regard
to the diachronic or temporal dimension: A person is autonomous over time if
she enjoys synchronie 'global autonomy' in the socio-relational sense throughout
^* For a clear statement of the additive view, see Double 1992, 69, and Friedman 2003, 4.
^^  Although I regard this description as adequate, some important qualifications are to
follow.
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her life. Hence, both Christman and Oshana conceptualize diachronic autonomy
additively.
In the remainder of this section, I want to indicate that the additive un-
derstanding of diachronic autonomy embraced by Oshana and Christman does
not provide us with an adequate conception of what leading an autonomous life
(in the relevant sense) amounts to, because both accounts are too static. This
is due to their synchronie conceptualization of autonomy. In the next section,
I will then relate this claim to the question how the social dimension is to be
incorporated.
To avoid misunderstandings, let me emphasize that my discussion of the views
that Oshana and Christman provide is not primarily intended as a criticism of
these accounts. As I have indicated in the last section, it is a fively possibility that
they have different practical interests in the concept of autonomy and thus might
not want to provide a notion of 'diachronic autonomy' as an ideal that describes
one worthwhile way of living one's life among others. Nonetheless, examining
how their accounts fare with regard to this latter interest might prove helpful
to take first steps towards a conception of autonomy that is meant to fit this
interest.
Synchronie vs. Diachronic Accounts of Autonomy—Setting the Stage
Implict in a synchronie understanding of autonomy is the claim that we can
fix a person's autonomy at every single point of time. Sometimes, it might be
necessary to look at how a person behaves over extended periods of time and
over a range of different situations, but only for epistemic reasons, i.e. in order
to determine whether a person really meets the relevant conditions in a robust
manner, as Christman puts it. By contrast, the suggestion that autonomy is
a property of a person's way of living, which I want to make plausible, is the
view that whether a person is autonomous cannot—for conceptual and not for
epistemic reasons—be determined by looking at single points of time. Autonomy
is conceived of as essentially diachronic. It is regarded as a diachronic property
of persons.^^
As I have said in connection with how Oshana puts into view the constitu-
tively relational approach, drawing on examples is, at the same time, a hard task
and the only way to motivate a shift in focus (be it social or temporal). For my
purposes, convincing examples need to be found in which a person's autonomy
can only be fixed over time. In other words, what needs to be shown is that
judgments about a person's autonomy in a synchronie fashion fail to capture
our intuitions (that are informed by the practical interest I have specified), and
that we can only make sense of our intuitions by thinking of autonomy as a
diachronic property that describes a person's way of living over
^^  Meyers draws a distinction between "episodic autonomy" and "programmatic autonomy".
The former notion of autonomy applies to single decisions or desires at some time, while the
latter notion applies to a person's way of living (see Meyers 1989, 48ff.). However, Meyers does
not take a stand on whether (a certain notion of) autonomy is essentially diachronic in the
sense that I have described.
^^  I would like to thank John Christman for helping me to formulate the challenge in an apt
way.
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Oshana's Additive, Socio-Relational Account of Diachronic Autonomy
As regards Oshana's account, the following kind of examples suggests itself: Ima-
gine a person who accidentially gets into a situation where the socio-relational
properties Oshana considers as essential to autonomy are absent. For exam-
ple, a person becomes unemployed and lacks the material resources that partly
constitute substantive independence, or she suddenly finds herself in a social en-
vironment where she is illegitimately required to take responsibility for another's
needs, or she is treated as someone who is not being able to competently judge
her situation. According to Oshana, this settles the question of autonomy. As
long as the person does not enjoy the social position of substantive independence,
she cannot be labelled autonomous
But now imagine that the person, in the course of managing her life, exhi-
bits a great level of creativity in dealing with her unemployment. She adapts
to her disastrous financial situation and takes steps towards supplying herself
with a minimal level of financial self-sufficiency, so that she is not dependent
upon the good will of others. Or imagine that she opposes to the undue expec-
tations to take responsibility, and changes her situation by getting out of the
relationships. Or she refutes the ascription of being incompetent and insists on
deciding for herself. In these cases, it seems counterintuitive to label the person
non-autonomous. To the contrary, her way of dealing with the situations seems
to indicate that she enjoys a great level of autonomy in the sense that interests
me here.^* This yields a picture of the autonomous person as being able to adapt
to changing environments, to imagine alternative possibilities, to take necessary
steps to change (unlucky) situations, to distinguish those expectations or as-
criptions that are legitimate from those that are not, and to oppose to others if
necessary.
What conclusions can be drawn from these examples? To begin with, I claim
that Oshana's theory produces counterintuitive results when applied to persons
who continue to exercise skills or competencies for adaptation, imagination, the
realistic evaluation of their situation, and for emancipation in environments that
are problematic for some reason or another. By saying that these environments
are 'problematic', I happily concede to Oshana that such environments are po-
tentially autonomy-threatening. But I want to suggest that being autonomous in
the sense that interests me means that, among other things, a person can resist
and emancipate herself from such environments.
Furthermore, the counterintuitive results seem to be directly related both to
the synchronie and to the socio-relational conception of autonomy that Oshana
embraces. On the one hand, it seems that whether a person has the relevant
competencies cannot be determined at some time. One must instead look at the
manner in which she leads her life over time. On the other hand, describing
autonomy as being constituted by specific socio-relational properties at some
*^ Similar considerations are to be found in Meyers' review of Oshana's book (see Meyers
2008).
®^ In general, my way of describing autonomy in this section bears great similarities with the
view that Meyers (1989) embraces. For the condition that a person must be able to imagine
alternative possibilités, see MacKenzie 2000.
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time yields a conception of autonomy that is too static. The socio-relational
account does not allow for the possibility that persons retain their autonomy
under circumstances in which the socio-relational properties axe absent. But in
the light of the examples I have given, and I take these not to be unrealistic in
a damaging sense, this is counterintuitive.
What cannot be concluded from these examples is that the constitutively re-
lational approach should be rejected in general, for the reason that the 'temporal
dynamics' of autonomy cannot be accounted for within such an approach. There
might well be other ways of setting out such an account, a question that I will
attend to in the next section. Also, one should refrain from claiming that Osha-
na's socio-relational account is to be abandoned altogether. As I have mentioned
above, it might well serve a practical interest in autonomy that is different from
the one that I have in autonomy.
Christman's Additive, Causally Relational Account of Diachronic Autonomy
The account given by Christman can be confronted with different kinds of ex-
amples. Consider again Peter who feels deeply alienated from his disposition to
compete with others (see section 2.). At some time, Peter moves places because
he has obtained a new job, and in his new social environment, being competitive
is a trait that is regarded as highly valuabe. Now imagine that, all of a sudden,
Peter's feelings of alienation fade away. He cannot fully explain this transition
to himself, but he now enjoys competing with others and happily registers his
constant desire to do so. All of this happens under conditions of procedural inde-
pendence, and there are no reasons to doubt that Peter meets the conditions for
self-reflection in a robust manner. Before and after his transition, his reflection
yields the same results repeated over a variety circumstances. According to the
conditions for autonomy that Christman puts forwards, Peter is non-autonomous
relative to his desire before his transition, while he counts as autonomous after
the transition. The question of autonomy is settled by the reflective state of
alienation/non-alienation at some time.
However, this way of treating the example strikes me as inadequate. In order
to answer the question whether Peter is diachronically autonomous, it does not
seem to suffice that we know that at some point of time il, or over some period
of time Í1-Í2, he feels alienated from his desire, while at í3 and from then on he
does not undergo any feelings of alienation. What needs to be known in addition,
I claim, is how the 'change of mind' has come about. It is mere luck that Peter
undergoes the change? Is it mere adaption to his environment (provided that he
is aware of the way in which his environment influences him and that he does
not feel alienated from these factors)? In both cases, I suggest, we would not
regard him as autonomous in the sense that is at stake here.
What seems relevant to the question of Peter's diachronic autonomy is how
he approaches his new environment and relates to himself over time. The change
in environment and the support that he is provided when expressing his dispo-
sition to compete with others allows Peter to take a new perspective on himself.
Put crudely, other persons provide him with the opportunity to change his at-
titude towards his disposition. In order to count as autonomous, it seems, a
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person must be able to encounter new situations, to listen to others and to allow
them to provide new perspectives. But an autonomous person must also be able
to emancipate herself to some extent from the immediate reactions of others,!
and to resist the opportunity for a change in order to stay 'true to herself. If
Peter merely succumbs to the reactions or expectations of his environment, we
would not count him as autonomous. Exercising capacities for what might be'
called 'self-exploration' and 'emancipation' seems to be necessary for leading an^
autonomous life. Crucially, this will be an ongoing process that is necessarily|
temporally extended, and the capacities themselves are diachronic properties of
a person that cannot be fixed at some time. ^
What lessons can be drawn from this example? To begin with, I would like^
to emphasize that (in contrast to Oshana) Christman has much to say about
the temporal dimension of autonomy, albeit in a synchronie way. On the one
hand, a person must take into account the historical processes that gave rise,
to her motivational states and that influenced her capacities for self-reflection.
On the other hand, a person must meet the conditions in a robust manner in|
that she exercises them repeatedly over varying circumstances. Unfortunately,;
I cannot do full justice to these views. However, I believe that there are quite
general reasons why there is no room for change, and for describing change as
being autonomous or non-autonomous, within Christman's account. On the one
hand, he wants to conceptualize autonomy in a synchronie fashion. If my above
considerations are plausible, this yields counterintuitive results when applied to,
specific cases, exactly because we need to look at the way in which a person leads^
her life over time in order to assess her autonomy, since the relevant capacities'
or competences are themselves essentially diachronic. On the other hand, the
impossibility of autonomous change has to do with the way in which Christman!
conceives of the capacities that are relevant to autonomy. In his view, the social
environment of a person only causally contributes to the development and exer-'
eise of these capacities, while their exercise can be described at some time and
without direct reference to other persons. I have suggested, by contrast, that in
order to exercise the relevant capacities for, e.g., self-exploration, we must enga-
ge in temporally extended and dynamic interpersonal relationships with other
persons that provide us, e.g., with new perspectives on ourselves.
Similar to Oshana's case, it cannot be inferred from my considerations that;
causally relational accounts are to be rejected in general, because there might
be other ways of defending such accounts. Nor should one reject Christman'?
account in general. Again, it might well serve a different practical interest in
autonomy than I have—something to which Christman might happily agree. •
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5. Reconsidering Relational Autonomy—The Social and
Temporal Dynamics of Autonomy
The basic 'liberating' idea underlying the account I have hinted at in the last
section is that we need not conceive of autonomy as a property that is instan-
tiated at some time, applied to particular motivational states or to persons and
constituted by psychological or social states (synchronically described). We can
rather think of autonomy as a property that is applied to a person's way of
leading her life over time, and that is constituted by capacities and skills that
are themselves diachronic properties of persons and therefore cannot be fixed at
single points of time.^°
Before I finally turn to the question how the practical interest in diachronic
autonomy (and an account of autonomy conceived of as essentially diachronic)
relates to the question whether to endorse a causally or a constitutively relatio-
nal account, let me shortly place my account of diachronic autonomy into the
framework for discussion that I have provided in section 4, in order to rebut
some immediate objections and worries.
Diachronic Autonomy
The concept of autonomy I am interested in is meant to describe an ideal that
informs persons who strive for leading a life of their own. This practial interest
seems different from the interests that Oshana and Christman have, who both
aim at a concept of autonomy that is relevant in the context of political theory.
For this reason, I have repeatedly emphasized that my discussion of their views
should not primarily be understood as a criticism. Their accounts have rather
allowed me to develop a different perspective on autonomy and on its relational
reconceptualization.
Having said this, it should also be clear that a view of diachronic autonomy
is not directly vulnerable to criticisms that question how such a concept might
'"' This view connects with the suggestion that has been signified by Gerald Dworkin (whose
specific conception of autonomy is very different from the one I have foreshadowed here), who
claims that "autonomy seems intuitively to be a global rather than a local concept. It is a
feature of persons that evaluates a whole way of living one's life and can only be assessed
over extended portions of a person's life." (Dworkin 1988, 16) In an unpublished manuscript
(Christman 2004), that has partly moved me to regard autonomy as essentially diachronic,
Christman has also pointed at such a view. While in his most recent publication (Christman
2007) he seems to have taken a step back (understanding autonomy in a synchronie way,
albeit with important qualifications; see above), Christman has emphasized in correspondence
that he now wants to conceive of autonomy as essentially diachronic (in Christman 2009). He
is moved to this position because he regards selves as essentially diachronic. If autonomy is
government by one's authentic self, and if selves are essentially diachronic, then autonomy also
has a diachronic element. Although I cannot substantitate this claim here, I suppose that this
position is still different from the one I wish to embrace. I tend to think that the competences
or capacities that are relevant to autonomy are essentially diachronic, while in Christman's
view (only) the self is regarded as essentially diachronic. Now, Friedman has argued that there
is an important gap between the claim that selves are socially constituted and that autonomy
is constitutively social (Friedman 2003, 94fi'.) which yields the slogan: 'social selves, individual
autonomy'. Similarly, one might possibly subscribe to the claim of 'diachronic selves, synchronie
autonomy'.
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usefully be applied to contexts where questions like 'Is interference with a per-
son's decision legitimate?' or 'Is the person responsible for her actions?' arise. It
is not directly intended to be applicable to such contexts. Also, an account of
diachronic autonomy will not be under pressure to be content-neutral, because
it is explicitly introduced as a valuable ideal to which persons might relate.
I contend that the interest that underlies my discussion of autonomy is le-
gitimate because there are many people who desire to lead a life of their own.
More to the point, it seems to be an intrinsic desire that is informed by the first-
personal perspective of persons (the accounts given by Oshana and Christman
reflect, in contrast, a third-personal interest). In addition, the desire seems to be
implicit in the conception of a good life, because although there might be good
ways of leading one's life that do not exhibit autonomy, these will not qualify as
a person's (in an emphatic sense) own good ways of living.
What has to be shown is that a conception of diachronic autonomy as an
ideal yields a notion of autonomy that many persons can connect to, i.e. that
they identify as a worthwile or desirable way of living, although they might
choose to pursuit other values. Also, it must be shown that this conception of
autonomy can be distinguished from the notions of authenticity (in the sense of
self-realization''^) and of the good life in order to qualify as conceptually distinct.
This cannot be accomplished in the context of this paper.
Are there any constraints on a conception of autonomy that derive from
the practical interest I have began to make explicit? My discussion in the last
section has yielded two such constraints: to allow for, and to be able to describe,
the possibility of autonomous change (what might be called the condition of
change)] and to allow for the possibility of resistance and emancipation within
social environments (what might be called the condition of emancipation). An
account of diachronic autonomy must avoid the consequence that persons are
'caught up in theraselves'*^ as well as that they are 'caught up in society'. These
conditions axe motivated by the examples I have given and by more general
reflections on intuitions about what makes for a life of one's own. They lead me
to the question how the social dimension is to be incorporated into an account
of diachronic autonomy in the sense that interests me.
''^  In her discussion of Meyers' account, Oshana presents a criticism along these lines (Oshana
2006, 40). In my view, this criticism reflects the fact that Oshana does not take seriously enough
the possibility that there might be more than one notion of personal autonomy in which one
might have a legitimate interest.
"•^  In a paper presented at the Workshop on Bratman in Bern in September 2007, I have
tried to show that Bratman's account of autonomy (and temporally extended agency) yields the
counterintuitive result that persons who are 'caught up in themselves' qualify as exemplars of
autonomy. I explain this unwelcome result (partly) by Bratman's neglect of the social dimension
of autonomy (see Baumann 2007). In reply to this charge, Bratman has claimed that my notion
of autonomy really is a notion of 'thoughtfulness'. But this move seems inadequate, because
it merely stipulates that a certain conception of autonomy is the only one. A more adequate
move available to Bratman, that is congenial to my considerations in section 4, would be to
argue that he pursues a different practical interest in autonomy.
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Is Diachronic Autonomy Causally or Constitutively Relational?—Reconsidering
the Distinction
Interestingly, the conditions of change and emancipation mentioned at the end of
the last paragraph seem to pull one into different directions. The condition that
an account of diachronic autonomy should be able to describe how persons can
resist to and emancipate themselves from their social environment suggests a cau-
sally relational approach. If a person's autonomy is constituted by facts about her
social environment, it becomes impossible to describe her as being autonomous
despite her unfortunate condition. I would agree with Oshana that certain social
conditions are potentially autonomy-threatening and often yield non-autonomy.
But talk of autonomy-threatening (instead of autonomy-undermining) conditi-
ons can only be made sense of if one does not conceive of autonomy as being
constituted by the social environment at some time.
The condition that an account of diachronic autonomy should allow for the
possibility of autonomous change, by contrast, seems to motivate a constitutively
relational account. If autonomy is conceptualized in a manner that describes au-
tonomy in a purely internal way—as something that happens within a person—,
the possibility of change seems to be foreclosed, since only by interacting with
other persons and one's social environment one can, as I have suggested, discover
new perspectives on oneself.
In fact, similar considerations have led some philosophers to subscribe to a
causally or a constitutively relational account. By emphasizing that persons often
demonstrate their autonomy in oppressive and potentially autonomy-threatening
contexts, Diana Meyers motivates a causal approach to the social dimension
of autonomy. Joel Anderson (2003), by contrast, points out the impossibility
to distinguish between "self-betrayal" and "change of mind" within models that
describe autonomy as an internal affair of a person. He contends that only within
a constitutively relational account that draws on the notion of 'giving an account
of one's actions to others' the distinction between self-betrayal and change of
mind, that is crucial to the notion of autonomous change, can be preserved."*^
I cannot even begin to examine these interesting accounts that are import-
antly different from the accounts given by Christman and Oshana. What I want
to suggest, however, is that one might pause a moment before settling on the
question whether autonomy is or should be regarded as causally or constitutively
relational, because the distinction itself seems to be a synchronie distinction that
is applied at some points of time. Coming back to the beginning of this paper, it
is meant to distinguish those accounts that treat social conditons as backgrounds
conditions from those that require a person to stand in specific relations or in a
specific social position. This distinction is implicitly given a synchronie reading:
a person's autonomy, proponents of the former approach claim, can be settled
with reference to her psychological states or capacities at some time, while de-
fenders of the latter approach argue that a person's autonomy must be specified
with reference to her social position or standing at some time.
''3 Similar views to the one defended by Anderson can be found in Westlundt 2003 and in
Benson 2005a and 2005b.
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The synchronie character or reading of the distinction yields the result that it
cannot be easily applied to a conception of autonomy that regards autonomy as
a diachronic property of a person's way of living her life over time. This explains
why the conditions of change and emancipation pull one into different directions.
Now, in my discussion in the last section I have already carefully suggested that
what is important to autonomy are certain interpersonal relations to others
over time. These relations are, I suggest, essentially diachronic relations that
cannot be described as synchronie states of affairs, neither of the external social
environment nor of the person's internal psychology. Consider, e.g., relations
of trust or of friendship. It is impossible to adequately describe a property of
trust or friendship that applies to single points of time, be it in an internalist
or in an externalist fashion.'''* One must rather understand these relations in
a diachronic way. And if. these diachronic relations are of importance to the
autonomy of persons, as I have indicated, it becomes at the same time even
more plausible to conceive of autonomy as essentially diachronic.
In order to be autonomous in the sense that interests me, a person must
not stand in speciflc relations to others at every single point of time. She can
retain her autonomy while being in contexts that are inimical to autonomy. But
she cannot stay in such contexts forever, for then she will loose her autonomy.
This can be explained by the fact that we need to stand in diachronic and dy-
namic relations to other persons in order to be capable of adapting to changing
environments, of engaging in self-exploration and self-deflnition, of imagining al-
ternative possibilities, of distinguishing legitimate expectations from those that
are not, and of emancipating ourselves from particular persons or environments.
Whether these capacities should be understood as causally or constitutively re-
lational, and whether this distinction is of practical importance in this context, ^ ^
must be left open until the distinction between such accounts is given a diffe-
rent, diachronic reading that at the same time captures practically important
differences.
By way of conclusion: we may not only need to reconsider how to conceptuali-
ze the 'social' in the light of a practical interest in autonomy as an ideal of living
that opens up both the social and the temporal scope of autonomy—we may
also need to reconsider the very distinction that underlies the quarrel between
defenders of causally and constitutively relational accounts, and re-evaluate its
practical and theoretical importance.^ ®
*^  For helpful discussions I would like to thank Christian Budnik who is working on an
account of personal identity that puts into its place the first-person perspective and that fits
well with my approach to autonomy. On the relevance of trust and self-trust for autonomy, see
Anderson/Honneth 2005; Benson 1994 and 2005; Govier 1993.
''^ In my description of the quarrel between Christman and Oshana it has become clear
that whether one conceptualizes autonomy as causally or constitutively relational can become
practically important in some contexts, for example if it has certain problematic theoretical
implications (it marks the divide between content-neutral and substantive accounts).
'*^  Parts of this paper were presented in different settings, including the Philosophy Depart-
ments at the Universities of Berlin, Bern, Tübingen and Zürich, the 'ä'^'^Meeting of the Swiss
Graduate Students in Philosophy in October 2006, and a Workshop on Bratman in Septem-
ber 2007. I would like to thank Anton Leist, Peter Schaber, Monika Betzier, Sabine Döring,
Thomas Schmidt and the organizers of the conferences for providing me with the opportunity
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